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Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: More than a lame duck 
By JULIUS MOTAL 
I was halfway through a lamb wrap at a restaurant near the Bosporus this past June when 
a van drove by blaring political messages in Turkish.  When I turned to look, I caught sight of 
the Prime Minister’s face, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, writ large, with unnaturally smooth skin for a 
60-year-old man. Invariably the words “SAĞLAM IRADE” or “MILLI IRADE,” Turkish for 
strong will and national will, were emphatically printed next to his face. The Erdo-van was a 
common feature of daily life in the city during my summer there. It was a significant feature, too, 
because it was part of Erdoğan’s presidential campaign in Turkey’s first presidential election in 
its history. Beneath that was his campaign logo, a setting red sun with a winding white road into 
what could be a tunnel and his name in blue. It bore a striking resemblance to President Barack 
Obama’s campaign logo, but Erdoğan’s team would probably tell you otherwise. 
The political van’s loudspeaker that cut into my lunch had the tonal quality of a call to 
prayer, the message heard from the top of every minaret five times a day. I turned to my 
companion who, despite being able to speak Turkish, could not make any sense of the 
message.  Historically, the presidency was a ceremonial position elected by members of 
Parliament, but on August 10, Erdoğan became Turkey’s first popularly elected president.  
My arrival coincided with the height of the election season. Billboards adorned the sides 
of buildings, roads and buses, and no matter which ferry I got on, whether it was crossing the 
Bosporus from the European side to the Asian side or vice versa, he was on television giving a 
speech. When I arrived in Istanbul, I had a vague sense of Turkish politics, but nothing could 
prepare me for how deeply ingrained politics is in the culture. I had come to Turkey to work for a 
lifestyle magazine for three months, so my professional occupation had more to do with vintage 
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shops and bars than Erdoğan’s omnipresence in Turkish life. I never saw the man in person. He 
existed in images, advertisements and television appearances each time I crossed the Bosporus. 
All of this is to say that Erdoğan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) dominated 
the election cycle.  
His strongest opponent was Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, an academic, diplomat and former 
Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the second largest 
intergovernmental organization after the United Nations. Ihsanoğlu was the joint candidate of the 
Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Turkish politics 
is a game of acronyms, with the three most important being: AKP, CHP and MHP. The CHP is a 
Kemalist party, that is to say it adheres to the politics of Turkey’s modern founder, Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk, a strident secularist who sought to Westernize Turkey in a break from its past as 
the center of the Ottoman Empire. The MHP is a conservative nationalist party that has secured 
its spot as the third largest party in Parliament, behind the CHP and Erdogan’s AKP. The CHP 
and MHP’s coming together in support of a joint candidate was a political marriage of 
convenience against Erdoğan’s political powerhouse.  
Of course, I learned all of this along the way. I had arrived in Istanbul on May 27, several 
days ahead of the one-year anniversary of the Gezi Park protests that shook the city and the 
country to its core. In 2013, there were plans to build a barracks that would house either a mall or 
a museum in Gezi Park, one of Istanbul’s most frequented parks in Taksim, a popular 
neighborhood for locals and foreigners alike. Those plans were met with civil disobedience. The 
quiet sit-ins soon turned violent when police raided the park in the middle of the night on May 
29, 2013 with tear gas, water cannons, batons and other forms of crowd control. The result was 
explosive in many ways, and the effects are still being felt.  
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The Gezi Park protests were the spark that set the city and the country ablaze. For the 
first couple of weeks following the police raid on Gezi, there were nightly protests in which 
police were out in full force with riot gear, tear gas launchers and TOMAs, large, armored trucks 
outfitted with water cannons designed for crowd control.  
 Video accounts show just how massive the protests during the first few weeks were. 
Much of the action took place on Istiklal Street, the main thoroughfare in Beyoğlu, one of the 
most popular districts in Istanbul of which Taksim is a part. Police would fire tear gas canisters 
at will, sending protesters onto side streets and into buildings where they could rest before 
heading back into the fray. 
 Gezi, and all the protests that followed, were indicative of growing unrest with Erdoğan’s 
increasingly authoritarian rule and the wide-ranging reach of his party. The proposed 
construction of the barracks in Gezi Park was just one large project in a string of large projects 
that Erdoğan was determined to complete. The public’s outcry and demonstrations against his 
wishes did not sit well with him. 
“If this is about holding demonstrations, if this is a social movement, where they gather 
20 I will gather 200,000. Where they gather 100,000, I will bring together 1 million from my 
party,” Erdoğan threatened in a televised speech last June, two days into the protests. 
That rhetoric only stood to further enrage the demonstrators, and it is indicative of 
Erdogan’s outsized personality approach to anything he does not like.  
“Turkish political culture is more of a one-man show,” Baybars Orsek, the leader of an 
NGO in Turkey focused on getting Turkish youth politically involved, said. 
Erdoğan is that one man. Born in Istanbul on February 26, 1954, Erdoğan grew up in a 
conservative Muslim household; his father was a member of the Turkish Coast Guard. The 
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young Erdoğan played semi-professional football, while studying business administration at 
Marmara University. It was in college that he became interested in politics, first by joining the 
National Salvation Party (MSP) in 1976, which was headed by Necmettin Erbakan, who would 
later serve as Prime Minister of Turkey for one year, from 1996-1997, before being pressured 
into stepping down for conflating religion and state. After a military coup in 1980, Erdoğan 
joined the Islamist Welfare Party (RP), and in 1984, became the RP’s Beyoğlu District Chair; the 
following year, he moved up to the Istanbul City Chair. Erdoğan was elected to Parliament in 
1991, but a legal technicality kept him from taking his seat; he remained politically active, until 
winning Istanbul’s mayoral election in 1994. 
Now, Erdoğan is the architect, and the face, of the AKP, which was formed in 2001, and 
won control of the government the following year. The prime ministership, however, did not 
immediately go to Erdoğan, who was technically disqualified because of a 1998 conviction for 
inciting religious hatred. The previous year, as Mayor of Istanbul, Erdoğan had been a member 
of the Welfare Party, which was Islamist in nature and because of that, it was deemed 
unconstitutional and shut down. At a party rally, Erdoğan had read a poem that contained the 
lines: “The mosques are our barracks, / The domes our helmets, / The minarets our bayonets, / 
And the believers our soldiers.” That public display of Islamic faith in an adamantly secular 
society earned Erdoğan a 10-month prison sentence, of which he only served four. His sentence 
was reduced following an unsuccessful appeal to get it overturned completely. 
 
TURKEY’s secularism has its roots in the principles of its founding father, Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1922 left Turkey at a crossroads. 
Atatürk then led the country to victory in the Turkish War of Independence in 1923, and with 
Dec.	  10,	  2014	   5	  
eyes toward the future, he essentially overhauled Turkish society from the ground up. Two of the 
most potent examples of that were the Romanization of the Turkish alphabet, which boosted 
literacy, as a Romanized version was better suited to the Turkish language; and the declaration of 
Turkey as a secular state, a clear break from its history as the capital of the Muslim world. 
 For Erdoğan, secularism meant suppression of his Muslim identity and, during the 2002 
election, an outward realignment of his political ideology. While there are Islamist overtones to 
the AKP, it bills itself as a socially conservative party. Erdoğan would later gloss over the poetic 
incident that landed him in jail. According to Hugh Pope, the Deputy Program Director for 
Europe and Central Asia at the International Crisis Group, “During the campaign, Erdoğan told 
visitors to the AKP’s headquarters that he simply wanted to be known as a conservative, and 
explicitly stated that he had broken with his radical Islamist past.” Secularists, however, worried 
that Erdoğan, given his past, would conflate religion and government, which has been a point of 
contention, both for critics at home and abroad, in the years since he came to power as Prime 
Minister in 2003. He cruised to the prime ministership when then Prime Minister Abdullah Gül 
stepped down, in order “to make way for his party’s leader,” according to a 2003 article on CNN.  
Gül then became Turkey’s president, a largely ceremonial post. That change of power cemented 
Erdoğan’s, and the AKP’s, place in Turkish politics and society. But it would not be without its 
challenges. 
 The biggest pushback came from the CHP, the secular party that was wary of Erdoğan’s 
Islamic tendencies, and also the military. The military was a sizable threat to Erdoğan’s AKP, as 
it had already overthrown the Turkish government three times: in 1960, 1971 and 1980. Each 
coup left Turkey increasingly unstable. Erdoğan was 48 when he became Prime Minister in 
2003, which was considerably young, and that youthful vigor gave him a certain advantage. The 
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year before he became PM, Erdoğan went a whirlwind tour of European capitals, and as Pope 
writes, “European counterparts were impressed by Erdoğan’s direct approach and relieved by his 
reformist program.” While he made a good show abroad, Erdoğan’s monomaniacal approach to 
governance at home would cleave the country in half politically. 
 “He is the buyuk usta,” Steven Cook, a Turkish expert at the Council on Foreign 
Relations, said. “Buyuk usta” is Turkish for great master, a title bestowed on Erdoğan by his 
most fervent constituents. He is often introduced publicly as: “Here comes the Great Master!”  
There is a cult of personality surrounding Erdoğan, particularly among religious 
conservatives, who favor his public displays of faith and appeals to the faithful. One of his 
strongest earlier moves was his rallying against the headscarf ban for state workers, which had 
been in effect since 1924, a year after the founding of the Turkish Republic. It was illegal for 
women working for the state to cover their heads, but with the rise of the AKP that began to 
change. In 2008, the ban was temporarily lifted before it was struck down by a court, and in 
2013, it was officially lifted. Critics maligned it as creeping Islamism, whereas supporters 
leveraged it as a push for equality. 
 
THERE were covered and uncovered women all around me in my time in Istanbul. From 
the metro barreling through Istanbul’s underground to the cafes overlooking the Bosporus, 
religious expression abounded. At a bus stop early in my stay, three women approached the 
intricate map of Istanbul’s bus routes. Each headscarf was a splash of color and design, woven 
works of art that had personality and style, a testament both to their faith and fashion sense. 
There was the ezan, too, or the call to pray as it’s known in English, that added to the religious 
atmosphere. Given Istanbul’s sloping landscape, the call to prayer from every mosque had an 
enveloping quality, like waves continuously crashing on the shore. If I found myself at a certain 
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point, somewhere equidistant between several mosques, it felt like I was in an echo chamber, at 
turns comforting and not so depending, of course, on the quality of the singer. I didn’t know 
Turkey when it was strictly secular, so all of this seemed rather natural. I had come here with the 
understanding that I was entering a Muslim country, that customs and sentiments were vastly 
different from New York City. Early in my stay, my companion told me about the phrase, “To be 
a Turk is to be a Muslim.” As the summer moved on, the more I realized that this was true. 
Turkey was indeed a Muslim nation, and Erdoğan appealed to that sentiment strongly. 
 Erdoğan’s tenure as Prime Minister, from 2003 until 2014, saw widespread gains for the 
AKP from multiple sectors of Turkish society. Renewed talks with the European Union and 
reforms that considerably boosted Turkey’s economy, particularly during the 2008 world 
financial crisis, gave Erdoğan and his party the edge they needed to stay in power. In a piece in 
The Atlantic, Aaron Stein wrote, “Lots of people that did not compromise (sic) part of the AKP’s 
core constituency, for example, would lambast Erdoğan publicly but would quietly vote for him 
because he was handling the economy well and they were pleased with growing liberal 
freedoms.” Erdoğan could only ride that wave for so long before his grand ambitions, mostly in 
the form of large projects, like the barracks in Gezi Park, would become the clarion call for his 
opposition. 
 There was not really any doubt that Erdoğan would win the presidential election this 
year. In public appearances, he would get nearly all of the screen time, with his opponents 
getting relatively little by comparison. This translated into the election results on Aug. 12, with 
the Kurdish candidate Selahattin Demirtaş getting 10% of the vote; the CHP and MHP’s 
Ekmelledin İhsanoğlu getting 38%; and Erdoğan squeaking by to victory with 52%, avoiding a 
run-off election with İhsanoğlu, had he gotten less than 50%. Ascending to the presidency meant 
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that Erdoğan had to resign from the AKP, as his party does not allow a member to hold more 
than three elected positions. While he may have resigned, the AKP is still very much Erdoğan’s 
party. What remained an imperative for Erdoğan was finding a way to wield the power he 
exercised as Prime Minister, and he was put to the test almost immediately with a conflict 
brewing just across Turkey’s southeastern border in Syria. 
 A Sunni jihadist, terrorist organization known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham 
has been battling for control of Kobani, a small Syrian border town very close to the Turkish 
frontier, which it had overrun at the end of September. ISIS, as the organization is known, spun 
out of the Syrian civil war, and has made considerable gains both in territory and wealth for 
much of 2014. Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared himself to be the caliph of the Islamic 
State, which ISIS had established on June 29, a caliphate which it claims extends over the 
territory it has captured in Syria and Iraq.  
For Erdoğan, Kobani is a test of his leadership and tolerance. Turkey’s foreign policy has 
for decades been a “good neighbor policy” in which Turkey has no problems with adjacent 
states, and while Erdoğan clearly detests embattled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, he has not 
taken military action against his regime.  
What further complicates the Kobani crisis for Erdoğan is Kobani’s strong Kurdish 
population, an ethnic group that spans several countries including Iraq, Syria and Turkey. The 
Kurds are Turkey’s largest ethnic minority and one of Erdoğan’s biggest headaches. Turkey has 
been in a 30-year conflict with the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), which has been fighting for 
Kurdish autonomy and which the U.S. declared a terrorist organization in 1997. The conflict 
simmered during Erdoğan’s tenure as Prime Minister; there were attempts at peace talks, but the 
talks never went anywhere. On top of that, Erdoğan was unwilling to intervene on behalf of the 
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Kurds in Kobani, and he initially prevented the Peshmerga, Iraqi Kurdish fighters, from passing 
through Turkey into Syria to fight alongside their brethren.  
As the battle for Kobani intensified, President Obama authorized airstrikes on ISIS in 
Syria and Iraq, but he was met with opposition from Erdoğan when he wanted to use Turkish 
airbases. In a confounding move, the Turkish government ordered airstrikes against Kurdish 
militias fighting ISIS because of their alleged allegiance with the PKK. Turkey considers both 
the PKK and ISIS enemies of the state, but yet, the PKK and Turkey share a common enemy in 
ISIS. Perhaps Erdoğan hoped the PKK and ISIS would do each other in; but, faced with 
mounting internal and international pressure, he reversed course and allowed Iraqi Peshmerga to 
pass through Turkey into Kobani on October 31. Turkey has not, however, taken any decisive 
military action against ISIS, and that is most likely due to the threat of a spillover into Turkey. 
Any step in the wrong direction could have severe repercussions for Erdoğan who is trying to 
further build his legacy as the most important Turkish statesman since Atatürk. 
During my time in Istanbul, the one face I saw in equal measure with Erdoğan’s was 
Atatürk’s, whose portrait adorned the walls of nearly every small shop and eatery in the city. 
There seemed to be a collective reverence for Atatürk, while the country is moving farther and 
farther away from the principles that so clearly defined his legacy and shaped much of Turkey’s 
history until the formation and rise of the AKP under Erdoğan. In an extravagant move on 
October 29, Erdoğan unveiled Ak Saray (White Palace), his new residence in Ankara. It is a 
$615 million, 1,150-room estate spanning 50 acres, with an additional $135 million budgeted for 
it next year, according to the BBC. Bigger than the White House, the Kremlin and Buckingham 
Palace, it has replaced Çankaya Köşkü as the official Presidential residence. Prime Minister 
Ahmet Davutoğlu can now call Çankaya home, while Erdoğan enjoys the spoils of a vast and 
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ostentatious new compound. What further complicates this for many is its incursion on protected 
forested lands, originally gifted to Turkey by Atatürk himself. Erdoğan then took matters further 
with the announcement of a 250-room extension of the complex, which will serve as his 
residence within Ak Saray, and will cut further into those protected lands. In a blog post for 
CFR, Steven Cook wrote, “The new palace is a physical representation of what the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) has sought to do since it came to power 12 years ago: Bury 
Atatürkism, rendering it a historical artifact – a fossil all the while aggrandizing the new great 
man, Erdoğan, who the faithful refer to as the “Great Master.””  
Erdoğan has been at the helm of a new age in Turkey’s history, one in which he has 
sought to distance himself and the country from Atatürk’s legacy. Atatürk’s visage may be 
staring down from walls of shops and eateries, but Erdoğan is no longer looking up at him. There 
may come a day when those dusty portraits are replaced, and the face that will look down on the 
people passing by will be Erdoğan’s. 
